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Encounters with an Inconstant Cerberus:
A Response to Mr. Schmitt
For the December 2015 issue of the Federal Sentencing
Reporter, I analyzed the pieces of sentencing legislation
pending in the present session of Congress.' Part of that
analysis was an effort to assess the probable practical
impact of the bill most likely to move forward, the Senate's
Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act (SRACA). 2 My
impact analysis of the SRACA drew on three sources: fig-
ures provided by the Sentencing Commission in a state-
ment by Commission Chair Patti B. Saris to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, 3 an independent analysis by Dr. Paul
Hofer, formerly a senior member of the Sentencing Com-
mission's staff and now with the Federal and Community
Defenders, and my own interpretations of and extrapola-
tions from the available data.
In a March 3, 2o6, letter (which appears in this Issue
immediately before this response), Mr. Glenn Schmitt,
Director of Research at the U.S. Sentencing Commission,
says that I mischaracterized the Commission's figures on
two points.4 First, I suggested that the Commission's esti-
mate of 3,314 current inmates who might benefit from
Section 102 of the SRCA-which would broaden the exist-
ing "safety valve" provision of 18 U.S.C. S 3553(f)-might be
overstated because that estimate did not account for factors
in Section 102 that would disqualify inmates from consid-
eration, or for other disqualifying factors in the existing
provisions of S 3553(0. 5 Mr. Schmitt says the Commission
did take these factors into account in arriving at its estimate.
Second, in my discussion of Section so6 of the SRACA,
which would make retroactive the reductions in crack
cocaine penalties of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2o1o, I
characterized the Sentencing Commission's estimate of
5,826 possible beneficiaries as being the "number of old-
law crack offenders still in prison." 6 Mr. Schmitt says that
this characterization is inaccurate because the Commis-
sion's analysis excluded some old-law crack defendants still
in prison, and included only those who were "sentenced at
the old mandatory minimum penalties, and so could not
seek any further reduction under the amended sentencing
guideline, or who were unable to obtain a full reduction in
their sentence because the old statutory minimum penal-
ties acted to cabin the court's authority to reduce the sen-
tence to a point within the new sentencing guideline
range."7
I am happy to receive these corrections. On the first
point, I was either misinformed or, more likely,
misinterpreted the information I had about what the
Commission's numbers meant. On the second point,
I should have been more precise. I should have said that the
Commission's number was the number of old-law crack
offenders still in prison who were sentenced subject to
mandatory minimum sentences but had not received the
benefit of the Fair Sentencing Act. Therefore, if I may steal
a line from the fictional incarnation of Sir Thomas More,
I am well rebuked.8
Having now paraded myself in sackdoth and ashes,
there nonetheless remain several points worth further
discussion. The first is whether the corrections in
Mr. Schmitt's letter change my analysis of the likely effect
of the SRACA. The second is the perennial challenge posed
by a Sentencing Commission which is at once the primary
collector, principal interpreter, and sometimes jealous
guardian of data about the operation of the federal sen-
tencing system, a Commission that is at times an indis-
pensable Oracle and at others a touchy Cerberus barring
access to publicly funded data central to debates on large
public questions.
I. The Likely Effect of the SRACA
The basic thrust of my analysis of the SRACA was, and
remains, that it would be a modest step toward the ame-
lioration of some notably severe federal sentences, but that
it would affect relatively few federal prisoners. Nothing in
Mr. Schmitt's letter materially alters my bottom line on this
point.
Section 102 of SRACA, if enacted, would expand the
reach of the existing "safety valve" provision of 18 U.S.C.
S 3553(0. Qualifying beneficiaries of this provision would be
sentenced pursuant to the Guidelines applicable in their
cases, but without the limit imposed by a mandatory min-
imum sentence. Accordingly, some might receive lowered
sentences. The Sentencing Commission estimated that
3,314 defendants annually might potentially benefit from
Section 102. My rough guess was that, of this total,
approximately 1,200 might actually do so.9 Some, though
not all, of the assumptions upon which my approximation
was based were wrong. However, Dr. Paul Hofer used
publicly available Sentencing Commission data to perform
a rigorous analysis of Section 102. His conclusion, pub-
lished in FSR'0 and cited in my article," was that the annual
number of likely beneficiaries of Section 102 ranges from
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500 to 1,144. I invariably defer to Dr. Hofer's superior
expertise in all matters relating to federal sentencing sta-
tistics. I do so again here. In consequence, although the
credit belongs entirely to Dr. Hofer, I end up in the roughly
same place-an estimate that Section 102 might benefit, at
most, between i,ioo and i,2oo defendants annually.'"
As for Section io6, the SRACA provision making the
Fair Sentencing Act retroactive, Mr. Schmitt's letter
changes my assessment not at all. I made no effort to esti-
mate how many inmates would actually receive reduction if
Section io6 were enacted, but indicated that it would surely
be substantially fewer than the 5,826 the Commission
estimated to be theoretically eligible for relief. That remains
my judgment.
One primary obstacle to giving a numerical estimate of
those who would actually get a sentencing reduction under
Section io6 is that relief would be discretionary with the
sentencing judge.'" However, we have some suggestive data
on how judges might behave when presented with petitions
for retroactive relief After the Fair Sentencing Act passed,
the Sentencing Commission adopted conforming amend-
ments changing the crack-powder ratio in the Guidelines. It
made those guidelines amendments retroactive, even
though it lacked the authority to make the Fair Sentencing
Act itself retroactive. 14 In practice, this meant that defen-
dants could petition courts for discretionary retroactive
application of the amended guidelines, but not for retro-
active application of Fair Sentencing Act's changes to the
quantity thresholds for mandatory minimum sentences.
The Commission reports that 44.6 percent of the petitions
for retroactive application of the amended guideline were
denied.' 5 Of course, it appears that roughly one-quarter of
the denials were based on the fact that a statutory minimum
sentence remained in place due to the non-retroactivity of
the Fair Sentencing Act,' 6 a stricture that Section Io6 of the
SRACA would remove, thus opening the possibility that
some reductions denied after the guidelines change would
be granted if Section io6 passed. On the other hand, it is
also true that a judge who previously awarded a sentence
reduction pursuant to the guidelines change might be
reluctant to give the same defendant a second reduction in
response to Section io6, even if it were technically avail-
able. At all events, a very substantial proportion of inmates
technically eligible for consideration under Section io6
-would receive no actual sentence reduction.
In sum, Mr. Schmitt's letter provides no basis upon
which to alter my previously published conclusion about
the likely effect of the 2015 version of the SRACA:
I estimate the total annual number of actual benefi-
ciaries of the SRACA as, at most, 2,ooo, almost all of
them from the expansion of the 3553() safety valve
to defendants with 2-4 criminal history points. Even
using the Sentencing Commission's numbers of
potential beneficiaries, the bill could, at most, benefit
about 4,ooo defendants per year. Against these
numbers must be offset an unknown number of
persons not now subject to mandatory minimums,
who would be subjected by Sections io0 and 104 of
the SRACA to such minimums and would thus
receive longer sentences than they now do. Finally,
roughly 11,500 current inmates could, in theory, peti-
tion for sentence reductions, although far fewer than
that number would receive such reductions.' 7
II. The Commission and Its Data
The foregoing discussion illustrates one of the sometimes
underappreciated strengths of the federal sentencing
guidelines system and of the Sentencing Commission. The
very complexity of the Guidelines themselves and the
existence of a Sentencing Commission with a relatively
well-funded data collection and research arm means that we
have a plethora of statistical information about federal
sentencing. Consequently, we can have empirically based
arguments about what the Guidelines do, or what changes
to federal sentencing law might do, that would be difficult
or impossible in most other jurisdictions.
That said, what we know about federal sentencing is to
a large degree limited by the Sentencing Commission
staffs decisions about what data to collect, what questions
to ask about that data, and what to tell the rest of us about
what they have done. The Commission's role as collector,
interpreter, and guardian of data presents two broad
problems.
First, historically, the Commission's research has
largely been self-referential and judge-based. By this I mean
that the Commission has mostly been interested in data
about how the Guidelines are applied and the degree to
which judges have complied with the Guidelines' rules.
This is understandable, and in some measure even inevi-
table. The Sentencing Reform Act commanded the Com-
mission to collect data of this sort,' 8 and the application of
the Guidelines in each case creates reportable data about
the facts the Guidelines have decreed to be important.
Moreover, the Commission has limited staff and much of
its time is inevitably consumed by processing the never-
ceasing firehose of guidelines application data. That said,
particularly for a good many years post-Booker, the Com-
mission devoted immense resources to collecting and
arranging data on departures and variances, seemingly to
prove the continued relevance of guidelines rules in an
advisory era.' 9 By contrast, the Commission has done little
research on outcomes (by which I mean research about the
relation between various types of criminal sentences and
recidivism, crime rates, effects on communities, and so
forth), risk prediction models, the systemic costs of
imprisonment and other punishment types, the social costs
of crime, or other subjects that might help the Commis-
sioners decide what the rules should be, rather than telling
them how often the existing rules are adhered to.
Second, historically, the Commission kept much of its
data in-house, publishing compilations and analyses of data
in its invaluable annual Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing
Statistics, but not making the underlying data files directly
available to outside researchers or policy analysts.2" For
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a period, the annual datasets underlying the Sourcebooks
were made publicly available only through the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research,
and only after considerable time delay. The complete
unavailability of some datasets and the time lag involved in
releasing annual datasets to the Consortium made it diffi-
cult, and sometimes impossible, to check the Commis-
sion's analyses, and sometimes prevented outside
researchers from examining questions the Commission
chose not to ask.
Both of these historical difficulties have in recent years
been ameliorated. A few years ago, the Commission began
making its data files back to FY 2002 available for download
from its website.2 This has not only provided outside
researchers and policy analysts invaluable raw material, but
has also opened up a new vehicle of sentencing advocacy.
Now that the Guidelines are advisory, judges are at liberty to
give as much or more weight to the sentences other judges
have imposed on similar defendants as they do to the sen-
tence prescribed by the Guidelines. Defendants with savvy
counsel and adequate resources can now commission
independent statistical analyses of sentences imposed in
comparable cases.
Likewise, the Commission has begun to expand the
range of its research focus. A notable current example is
a study of recidivism based on a database combining
Commission data with rap sheet information provided by
the FBI. The Commission published an Overview of its
conclusions based on this dataset in March 2oi6,2 and
projects that it will publish further analyses of the data over
the next several years. One might kvetch a bit at the fact that
a research apparatus wholly devoted to federal sentencing
policy waited nearly thirty years to conduct a general study
of the recidivism of federal prisoners,2 3 particularly inas-
much as the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 specifically
mandated that the Commission "collect systematically and
disseminate information regarding effectiveness of sen-
tences imposed."2 4 But that would be ungenerous to the
good folks who are now advancing this invaluable project.
Commission Research Director Glenn Schmitt deserves
credit both for providing open access to the yearly data files
and for presiding over projects like the recidivism study.
Still, problems remain. On some points, the Commis-
sion retains its old territoriality, insisting on exclusive
control over some data sets and thus, as a practical matter,
over the questions they can be used to answer. Cerberus
still guards the sentencing data underworld (or, for you
Potter fans, the Chamber of Secrets), and sometimes he
wakes up and growls.
One difficulty relates to particular datasets upon which
Commission reports are based. Sentencing researchers
have for years requested that, when the Commission issues
a report on a particular topic, it also release the supporting
dataset. At various points, promises to do that have been
forthcoming. Indeed, in a letter dated April 24, 2014,
Mr. Schmitt stated that "in the next few months we will be
posting the datasets used in recent Commission
publications. 2 5 However, few if any such postings have
occurred.2
6
A current instance of this phenomenon involves the
Commission's recidivism study and the debate over the
SRACA. In early 2o16, a small group of conservative
Republican senators launched a campaign to scuttle the
SRACA. They contend that the bill would release "thou-
sands of violent felons, 2 7 in which category they include all
persons convicted of drug trafficking offenses, particularly
the defendants sentenced pursuant to drug mandatory
minimums who would be eligible for relief under several
provisions of the SRACA. Put dispassionately, their argu-
ment is that persons who commit drug crimes serious
enough to warrant imposition of a mandatory minimum
sentence pose a particularly high risk of committing violent
crimes upon release. This argument is capable of being
empirically tested if one has the necessary data ... which
happily the Sentencing Commission has recently gathered
in its recidivism dataset.
The recidivism dataset contains re-arrest (post-release
arrest for any reason including violations of conditions of
supervised release), reconviction (conviction for any new
criminal offense), and reincarceration data for all defen-
dants released from federal custody in 2005.28 Using this
data, one can identify the overall recidivism rates for
defendants convicted of different offense types. For defen-
dants convicted of a new offense post-release, the data
identifies the type of offense of which they were convicted,
and thus allows determination of whether the new offense
was violent or nonviolent. In short, analysis of this database
would permit the Sentencing Commission to determine
whether the class of drug defendants who might benefit
from the SRACA are or are not likely to be violent recidi-
vists-thus confirming or refuting a primary conservative
argument against the bill.
Unfortunately, the Commission's recently published
Overview of the recidivism data does not answer the ques-
tions most germane to the SRACA debate. The publication
focuses primarily on re-arrest rate, rather than reconviction
rate, as a measure of recidivism. It does not separate from
the larger class of drug defendants those who were subject
to mandatory minimum sentences. And as to drug defen-
dants who are reconvicted, it does not identify the type of
crimes of which they were convicted. What is required to
address the claims made by Senator Cotton and colleagues
is the following information:
For defendants who were convicted of a drug offense car-
rying a mandatory minimum sentence, but who were not
subject to a firearms mandatory minimum:
(a) The five-year and eight-year felony reconviction rate
(meaning the rate of conviction of a new felony offense
following release from federal custody);
(b) Five-year and eight-year breakdowns of offense types
for which those reconvicted were convicted: that is, the
number and percentage of members of the class of defen-
dant described above who were convicted of homicide,
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rape, robbery, assault, drug offenses, property crimes, etc.
Based on the Commission's Overview publication and
a conversation with Mr. Schmitt, it should also be pos-
sible to differentiate within the assault category between
more and less serious grades of assault, e.g., aggravated
vs. simple assault, and within the category of drug
offenses between drug trafficking and drug possession.
This information is in the Commission's recidivism dataset
and the Commission, or anyone with access to its dataset,
could easily extract it.
I have asked Mr. Schmitt to have his staff perform the
necessary analysis, and thoroughly explained how impor-
tant it is to the SRACA debate. However, the response has
been that the Commission will not respond to requests for
analysis made by anyone other than judges, congressional
staff, or the Justice Department when acting in its policy
role. The justification for this general policy is that the
Commission lacks the staff to respond to such requests,
however germane they may be to a pressing public issue.
I understand this policy. The Commission is short-staffed
and it cannot commit to answering the questions of every
curious member of the public, or of every nosy academic.
Therefore, I asked Mr. Schmitt to release the dataset
underlying its recidivism study so that I (well not really me,
but somebody competent to do such statistical work) could
perform the necessary analysis in time to inform the con-
gressional debate. Mr. Schmitt again declined, insisting
that the Commission would retain exclusive access over the
data until it finished its projected series of publications on
recidivism. This response seems to me less justifiable.2 9
It may turn out that someone on Capitol Hill will realize
the potential impact of proper analysis of the Commission's
recidivism data, request such an analysis, and release it
publicly once received. That would be a happy outcome to
the present impasse. But even if that occurs, there remains
a larger problem. The Commission should engage in some
reflection about the proper balance between, on the one
hand, its resource constraints, its responsibilities to other
government departments, and its understandable desire to
get the first publication credit for analyzing data it collects,
and on the other hand, its obligation to inform public
debate over pressing sentencing policy questions and the
right of interested members of the policy community and
the public to obtain timely access to data which, after all,
was collected on the taxpayers' dime. Such reflection seems
particularly appropriate in light of the commands of the
Sentencing Reform Act that the Commission establish
a research program "for the purpose of serving as a clear-
inghouse and information center for the collection, prepara-
tion, and dissemination of information on Federal
sentencing practices," that it "publish data concerning the
sentencing process," and that it "collect and disseminate
information regarding effectiveness of sentences
imposed." 30
I do not mean to be unduly critical here' The Commis-
sion's research staff has an overwhelming job that it per-
forms admirably with fewer resources than it should
properly have. And, as noted above, the breadth of its
agenda and its commitment to getting information to the
public have both notably improved in recent years, in no
small part as a result of Mr. Schmitt's stewardship. But
there remains room for improvement. I hope these com-
ments might stimulate a conversation directed to that end.
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